The difficulty with petitioner's position is that the implications from the acts, which he admittedly performed, are ambiguous. He had a dual nationality, a status long recognized in the law. <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14270191881160802490&q=%22dual+citizenship%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6#> <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17485095411337455454&q=%22dual+citizenship%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6>Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 344-349.
The concept of dual citizenship recognizes that a person may have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both. 724*724 The mere fact that he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not without more mean that he renounces the other. In this setting petitioner's registration in the Koseki might reasonably be taken to mean no more than an assertion of some of the rights which his dual citizenship bestowed on him. Kawakita v. United States, 343 US 717
As we have said, dual citizenship presupposes rights of citizenship in each country. It could not exist if the assertion of rights or the assumption of liabilities of one were deemed inconsistent with the maintenance of the
other. For example, when one has a dual citizenship, it is not necessarily inconsistent with his citizenship in one nation to use a passport proclaiming his citizenship in the other. See 3 Hackworth, supra, p. 353. Hence the use by petitioner of a Japanese passport on his trip to China, his use of the Koseki entry to obtain work at the Oeyama camp, the bowing to the Emperor, and his acceptance of labor draft papers from the Japanese government might reasonably mean no more than acceptance of some of the incidents of Japanese citizenship made possible by his dual citizenship. .
Kawakita v. United States, 343 US 717, 725 (1952).
In Aguirre v. Nagel, 270 F.Supp. 535 (E.D.Mich.1967), the plaintiff, a citizen of the United States and the State of Michigan, sued a Michigan citizen for injuries sustained when she was hit by the defendant's car. The
court correctly ruled that the action was not one between citizens of different states under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Nevertheless, the court did find jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) because the plaintiff's
parents were citizens of Mexico and Mexico regarded her as a Mexican citizen by virtue of her parentage.
Sadat v. Mertes
citizenship%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,6> , 615 F. 2d 1176 - Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 1980.
In his brief, Von Dunser takes the position that federal jurisdiction exists on the basis of diversity of state citizenship. He argues that at the time he brought his action he was still a citizen of Florida, never having established a different domicile during his years in Europe. State citizenship for the purpose of the diversity requirement is equated with domicile. Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1180; Rodriguez-Diaz v. Sierra-Martinez, 853 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir.1988);
Valedon Martinez v. Hospital Presbiteriano de la Comunidad, 806 F.2d 1128 (1st Cir.1986). A person's previous domicile is not lost until a new one is acquired. Kaiser v. Loomis, 391 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir.1968); Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1986);
Maple Island Farm, Inc.v. Bitterling, 196 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.1952). Establishment of a new domicile is determined by two factors: residence in the new domicile, and the intention to remain there. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, ___, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1608, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989); 13 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3612.
Von Dunser v. Aronoff
ant+nationality%22&hl=en&as_sdt=4,56,57> , 915 F. 2d 1071 - Court of
Appeals, 6th Circuit 1990.
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